(with p articipation determined by an athlete 's citizenship) the world of professional clubs and to urnaments has signifi cant transboundary ch arac teristi cs that require n ongovermnental institutions such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to regulate its rules and competitions. Issues such as broadcast rights, free movement of labor, and n1illion-dollar acquisition of ownership rights have transformed the face of modern sport into on e that mirrors the corporate world of big business. D o the sports federations, thus, still have the capacity to regulate the expanding socio-economic dimensions of sport? The issue of anti-doping in the E uropean Union presents a case study that provides partial answers to this question, and gives insight into the futu re direction of international sp orts governan ce. In the past two years, the E uropean Union has dem onstrated a strong desire to incorpo rate the regulatio n of spo rt into its legal fram ework, achieved both through Conmussion work and decisions handed dow n by the E uropean Court of Justice.
In tandem with the unparalleled opportunities for international stardom and lu crative sponsorship and contracts, the use of performance-enhan cing drugs among athletes has increased considerably. The IOC has identified doping as the single greatest problem facing the sports community today.2 Traditionally, responsibility for regulating this problem has fall en to non-goverm11ental actors like the national sports federations and independent organizations such as the World Anti-Doping Associatio n (WADA) , created in 1999 under IOC auspices. The catalyzing o rga nization for European-wide consensus on the importance of regulating the doping problem was the Council of Europe, which published the European Anti-Doping C harter in 1984. Without making any comparable declarations on its interest in sports governan ce, the European Union nevertheless approached the issue circuitously through two sports-related cases b efore the European C ourt of Justice in the 1970s. These rulings -first in the Walrave judgment in 1974, followed by Dona in 1976 -reined in sport's previously independent status outside of EU market regulation. Yet for the European Union, the specific problem of doping would rem ain outside the policymaking agenda until just recently, notably in the Meca-Medina decision in July 2006 and the EC White Paper on Sport one year later, both of which con cretized the EU's will to legislate in the domain of sport.
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-DOPING POLICY
Historically, the Council of E urope, an entirely separate organization from the European Union institutions with its own legal structure, has provided the initiative for framing sport and its economi c and cultural significance in a European context. During the late 1960s, the eviden ce of doping in sport accumulated, m ost m arkedly with the deaths of professional cyclists as a result of amphetanline use. These revelations produced a watershed effect in policy development to address the negative health risks of doping (Houlihan 1999) . Apart from pure physiological gains, doping was further p romulgated throughout the 1970s and 1980s for political interests, since political suprem acy cam e to be associated with a nation 's sporting prowess in internatio nal competition . Cold War tensions contributed to the ratcheting-up of doping am ongst elite athletes. When it b ecame clear that certain Soviet Union athletes were experimenting with anabolic steroid use, American Olympic coaches and doctors justified their own clandestine doping regime on the basis of gaining geopolitical suprem acy. Clearly, if the Olympic Committees were subverting their own testing regimes, the impetus fo r anti-doping laws needed to com e from above. The m ost dynamic actors in the initial policy coordination stage were the sports federations, who http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/12 began instituting testing programs at major sporting events such as the 1966 World Cup. This was not simply a move aimed at preserving the ideals of their respective sports; rather, the federations were motivated by a desire to retain control over the anti-doping programs and keep goverrmlent-imposed solutions at arm's length. At the time, the IOC lacked the necessary resources to maintain an effective umbrella ban on doping, despite their unilateral declaration condemning the practice in 1962.
Involvement at a regional level was gradually initiated by the Council of Europe -a rival organization outside of the European Community -which positioned itself as an intermediate forum between national goverrullents and international sports federations . As Houlihan notes:
The reason for the interest of the CE in sport in general and doping in particular is a product of its broad objective to promote democratic government in Europe and the belief, which can be traced back to the League of Nations, that cooperation in areas such as culture creates a 'spill-over effect' in policy areas more central to the organization's priorities.
The CE produced a recommendation on doping in 1978 which emphasized the need to educate athletes and coordination among federations . In 1984, the most significant step yet in the fight against doping was the adoption of the European Anti-Doping Charter. The theme of the Charter was the familiar European goal of harmonization, stating "Sports organizations should be encouraged to harm.onize their anti-doping regulations and procedures, based on those of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the International Amateur Athletic Federation .. . " as well as using a common list of banned substances. 3 While the Charter invoked the goal of European harmonization, it explicitly left the task of administering anti-doping rules to the sports federations rather than national or regional governance. The Charter was welcomed by related stakeholders such as UNESCO, the World Health Organization, and the IOC among others. The document provided a model for the International Doping Charter (later renamed the Olympic Doping Charter) that was to follow in 1988. Beyond the general ideological consensus that doping must be eradicated as much as possible from sports, the complexity of actually implementing a transnational framework tested the strength of the traditional sports model.
Of foremost significance was the realization by international federations of the resource cost of implementing an effective doping control regime. As the debate moved from questions of principle, where the federations felt able to assert a prior right to set behavioral norms for athletes, to matters of implementation the resource capacity of government made a shift in the locus of decisionmaking inevitable (Houlihan 323).
As noted above, the early catalyst for anti-doping regulation was the non-EU affiliated Council of Europe. However, the transnational aspect of sport and the greater extent to which doping was becoming ingrained in elite-level sporting events created an incentive for EU involvement. For them to be an effective deterrent, anti-doping programs needed to be forceful and comprehensive, which would require outsized budgets beyond the means of the National Olympic COIl1lruttees or the sports federations. In order to ensure substantive results through comprehensive testing programs, the participation of Member State goverrullents became increasingly important, thus inviting greater EU action to Anti-Doping Policy in the European Union manage the disparate anti-doping regimes, justifYing their actions under the banner of harmonization. Before any anti-doping legislation would appear, however, the EU relied upon EC] rulings -some as early as the 1970s -to justifY interfering in the domain of sport.
THE ApPLICATION OF EU LAW TO SPORT
In Paragraph 1 of the Nice Declaration on Sport in December 2007 , the EU recognized that sport possesses certain "special characteristics," according it special status under existing EU treaty clauses.
Even though not having any direct powers in tlus area, the ConmlUnity must, in its action under the various Treaty provisions, take account of the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and making it special, in order that the code of ethics and the solidarity essential to the preservation of its social role may be respected and nurtured. 4 The so-called "specificity of sport" is a term established by early European Union case law that declares sports rules of a "purely sporting interest" to fall outside the scope of EU jurisdiction. Conversely, then, European law only applies to "economic activities." The Community courts and the Conmussion have also acknowledged the freedom of internal organization according to the European sports model, characterized by a monopolistic structure. (Typically, there is a single national sport association per sport and Member State operating under the umbrella of a single European association and one international association. 5 ) The "specificity" principle was upheld in the rulings of the Walrave6 and Dona 7 cases, wluch were the first cases ·involving sports rules to come before the Community courts during the 1970s. More recently, however, the Bosman decision in 1995 was a significant step in the direction of applying the Treaty on European Union's market law to the sport sector. 8 Bosman struck down football association rules that linuted international transfers and foreign membership of players on European clubs as violating Treaty of Rome and TEU free movement of labor laws. Thus, the commercialization of sport and its mirroring of the "big business" corporate model have indisputably changed the nature of sport to where sport raises substantial econonuc concerns. The plaintiffs in the case were two swinuners, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen, who had tested positive for the steroid nandrolone and received a four-year ban from the swinuning governing body, Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA) in 1999. After their case was rejected by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) , an arm of the IOC in Lausanne, the swinullers challenged the compatibility of the anti-doping rules with Articles 81 and 82, arguing that they restricted competition. In 2004, the Court of First Instance rejected the case, citing the "purely sporting" interest of the IOC anti-doping rules. The objective of anti-doping rules, it was argued, was the preservation of fair play rather than any econOlnic activity; thus, the CFI upheld the existing jurisprudence in the WaLrave, Dona, and Bosman decisions that subjected sporting rules to Conmmnity law only insofar as they constituted an economic activity.
Angered and unsatisfied with the CFI's judgment, Meca-Medina and Majcen played their final card: an appeal before the Conununity's highest court, the Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2006. While the ECl's final conclusion was in line with its lower court's previous ruling, it altered course from the CFI by calling into question the "specificity of sport" and establishing a test to decide whether the sporting rule represents either an "undertaking" or an "association of undertakings," in which case it would be subject to anti-trust law. In Paragraph 27, the Court concludes that ... the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down. 9 The judgment effectively established a case-by-case methodology to determine the nature of a sporting rule. No longer would "purely sporting" rules enjoy inmlediate exemption from Conununity law. Although the ECJ reiterated the findings by the Court of First Instance that anti-doping rules do , in fact, fall into the category of purely sporting rules, it nevertheless held that these rules must still be subjected to a novel test to determine their 1) o~jectives, 2) whether the anti-competitive effects are inherent in pursuing said objectives, and 3) if the effects are proportionate to the objectives .
. . . even if the anti-doping rules at issue are to be regarded as a decision of an association of undertakings limiting the appellants' freedom of action, they do not, for all that, necessarily constitute a restriction of competition incompatible with the common market, within the meaning of Article 81 EC, since they are justified by a legitimate objective. Such a limitation is inherent in the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport and its very purpose is to ensure healthy rivalry between athletes. lO The Court now has the same tools for assessing rules of a sporting nature as it does to regulate the internal market. While not explicitly revoking the special status of sport, the Meca-Medina case will allow for greater European scope when it comes to sporting activities that could potentially disrupt the proper functioning of the internal market.
THE EU TAKES Up THE FIGHT AGAINST DOPING
Following the promulgation of the European Anti-Doping Charter in 1984, momentum was gathering for further government involvement in addressing the problem Anti-Doping Policy in the European Union of anti-doping. The 1992 Olympics in Barcelona provided a fertile testing ground for the implementation of an EU-backed code of conduct, which was followed by a ConmlUnity Support Plan presented in 1999 in light of the doping scandals that had marred the 1998 Tour de France. 11 In that document, the Commission reconunended to the other EU institutions a three-part action plan: 1) the assembly of a relevant epistemic community to draw upon the ethical, legal, and scientific knowledge of experts; 2) assist in the creating of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) along with the Olympic Movement; and 3) generally increase the use of Conununity tools to integrate anti-doping policy into the supranational capacity. The reason for the Conunission's decision was primarily one of concern for public health. In the introduction, the Conunission states: Doping has always been at variance with the basic principles of sports ethics. Today, in view of the proliferation of cases, the phenom.enon of doping in sport no longer belongs within the strict framework of sports ethics but has also become a public health problem. In principle physical and sporting activity should contribute to improving the citizen's quality of life. However, the use of prohibited substances or medicaments abuse has adverse health effects and hence vitiates the very goal of sport. In the context of competitive sport, doping symbolizes the contrast between sport and the values it has traditionally stood for, nam.ely fair play and the idea of surpassing oneself through physical effort."12
The themes addressed in the Conununity Support Plan established a precedent for even more direct action by the EU.The Nice Declaration of December 2000 articulated by the European Council emphasized Europe's special relationship to sport as the region that gave birth to the O lympic movement and also the site of the majority of large sporting competitions. The COl1unission acted most recently with the publication of the July 2007 White Paper on Sport, which moved the EU closer to establishing a sports-related clause under treaty law.
The White Paper on Sport in July 2007 marked the first time the European Conunission had comprehensively addressed issues in the arena of sport, including a specific section entitled "The Fight against Doping" (Article 2.2.). N evertheless, as the document points out, the recognition that sport plays an important role in European society is not new, given the existing case law (as previously discussed) that already had come to frame sport as part of the acquis communautairc. Like the COllUnunity Support Plan that preceded it, the White Paper on Sport recognized the negative " health and prevention dimension" of doping, explicitly adding the need for a law-enforcement component at EU level. The exchange of best practices between WADA, UNESCO, INTERP0L13, and other stakeholders factors as a key goal of the Conunission. The White Paper floats the idea of "a network of national anti-doping organizations of Member States," which would theoretically gain a large degree of autonomy from the international sports federations in formulating broad anti-doping policy measures.
Despite the conciliatory "Euro-jargon" contained in the language of the White Paper, its endorsement by the Union represents a clear direction for European collaboration. The tactics of cooperation outlined in the White Paper reflect a particular policymaking approach aimed at greater EU involvement in sports governance. Wallace, Wallace, and Pollack define policy coordination as a "technique to develop light forms of cooperation http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/12 and coordination in fields adjacent to core EU economic competences in order to make the case for direct policy powers ... the approach rests a great deal on expertise, and the accumulation of technical arguments in favor of developing a shared approach and to promote modernization and innovation" (Wallace 85). Action by the Commission is typically the primary engine for setting the direction and pace of policy making in the coordination mode of policymaking. Most importantly, the Lisbon Treaty developed during 2007 makes a direct acknowledgement of sport under Article 2E, stating that the EU shall "carry out actions to support, coordinate, or supplement the actions of the Member States."14 Indeed, it would appear that the EU desires a greater degree of regulatory power to control anti-doping programs within its jurisdiction. Thus, pending ratification of the treaty by all 27 meluber states, sport and its attendant sub-issues will gain a legal basis under treaty law in addition to the existing juridical precedents for subjecting sport to internal market rules.
POLITICAL PUSHBACK FROM THE IOC AND SPORTS FEDERATIONS
These developments within the last two years -first the Meca-Medina ruling in 2006, followed by the White Paper on Sport in 2007 -elicited serious criticism from the IOC and the two largest governing bodies for football, FIFA and the Union Europeene de Football Association (UEFA). These non-governmental organizations have traditionally held substantial authority for sport regulation, and saw the European Union's legal and legislative forays into the sporting domain as an attack on their dominion. What was it about these two occurrences that differed from the consensus-building spirit of the 1980s and 1990s? The application of single market rules to sport in Meca-Medina, argued Gianni Infantino, UEFA's Director of Legal Affairs, represents:
. .. a potential Pandora's box of potential legal problems. For a start, almost any sports disciplinary measure for almost any offense (e.g. doping, match-fixing, gambling, bad conduct, etc.) might be described as representing a condition 'for engaging in' sporting activity.IS Similarly, current IOC president Jacques Rogge noted in an interview with the Financial Times on October 17, 2007 -days before the Lisbon summit would hammer out a new reform treaty -the critical need to establish a more well-defined legal basis for sport in European law, and hoped for a Treaty provision recognizing the specificity of sport. "The judgment of the Meca-Medina case is a bit frightening for us," said Rogge. "It puts doping under the competition rules of the EU.We have had established doping rules for a long time. We know proportionality of sentences is an issue, and we accept that. But we don't know why the EU should come in". 16 With regard to the White Paper on Sport, the IOC and UEFA teamed up to present a joint press statement that articulated their reservations over the expanding EU competency in their sphere of governance.
The White Paper is structured in full contradiction with the actual architecture of the Olympic movernent, ignoring in particular the regulatory competences of the International Federations, the division of responsibilities between the latter and their European Confederations, the global nature of the issues and challenges currently affecting sport as well as the solutions which are today necessary. 17 The non-governmental stakeholders like the JOC and the federations had also hoped for a ITlOre clear expression of the Nice Declaration to preserve the specificity of sport, and thereby their own powers in setting anti-doping and other sporting activity measures.
CONCLUSION
Relations between the sports governing bodies and the EU have often proved contentious; indeed, it took more than 30 years after the establishm.ent of the European Comm.unity in 1957 before the Union set up formal dialogue and liaisons with the IOC and the sports federations. The proposed Reform Treaty will perhaps allay some of the controversy over the lTI.anagement of sport within Europe. Just days after Rogge's disparaging comments about the Meca-Medina decision and his doubtfulness that the EU would continue to respect the specificity of sport, the Lisbon Reform Treaty, signed in December 2007 , introduced the first mention of sport ever included in a treaty document:
... the Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function . IS Naturally, the JOC welcol1l.ed this turn of events that they had been pushing for all along, and could count on retaining their traditional standing as the foremost regulatory body in the fight against anti-doping. However, more cases involving the test for determining whether or not a sporting activity contravenes Conullunity law are certainly on the horizon, and the potential for more concrete policymaking in the European Commission does not appear to be impossibility. While the European Union has come to an agreement over the fundamental values of sport and in particular the need for antidoping regulation, the problems of overlapping authority in setting policy and resolving disputes will ensure that the doping issue remains a source of friction.
The Meca-Medina decision and the EC White Paper on Sport were not the first instances of a European interest in anti-doping, yet they were significant for what they represented: the establishment of a legal basis for EU governance in sport. As explained above, during the 1990s the EU set itself in opposition to the Council of Europe whose initiatives had began the fight against anti-doping in the first place. By establishing its own legal regime separate from that of the CE and JOC, the European Union was essentially poaching a subject oflaw that had traditionally remained outside of the acquis communautaire. Brussels' actions in the sphere of sport indicate an astonishing trend: the single market and economic competition are being used to justifY a cultural and legal convergence across what many Europeans consider to be the domain of extra-EU organizations, exemplified by antidoping programs. Single market principles are spilling over into areas of EU competency that were wholly unintended by the original founders of the European Conullunity in 1957. As sporting events such as the Tour de France and the Olympics accrue even more international prominence through broadcasting and marketing rights, the stakes of athletic success -and the temptation to achieve that success by drug doping -are growing exponentially. Balancing the competing sovereignties of non-governmental actors with EU legislative powers in the future will be critical if the health of athletes and society's respect of sporting competition is to endure.
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